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i;f,\ikws. 


George  Washington  Flowers 
Memorial  Collection 

DUKE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 


ESTABLISHED  BY  THE 
FAMILY  OF 

COLONEL  FLOWERS 


PRINCIPLES  AND  MAXIMS 


OF    THE 


OUTPOST  SERVICE;  ' 
GENERAL  INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  BATTLE; 
REVIEWS. 


CHARLESTON : 

S  T  K  A  M  - 1'  (>  W  K  R    P  R  K  S  S    OF    K  V  A  N  S    &    COGSWELL, 
No.  S  Brond  an^  103  Kast  Bay  streets. 

1863. 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Arciiive 
in  2010  witii  funding  from    , 
Duke  University  Libraries 


littp://www.arcliive.org/details/principlesmaximsOObeau 


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PRIE1PLES  A^D  MAXIIIS  OF  WAR,  ETf. 


EXTRACTED,  ARRANGED,  AXD  PUIiLISHED  BY  GENERAL  G.  T.  BEAU- 
REGARD, C.  S.  A..  FOR  THE  USE  OF  GENERAL  OFFICERS  IN  THE 
DEPARTMENT  OF  SOUTH  CAROLINA,  GEORGIA,  AND  FLORIDA. 

Charleston,  S.  C,  May,  1863. 


PRINCIPLES. 

The  vvliole  science  of  AVar  may  be  briefly  defined  at;  the 
art  of  pUicing  in  the  right  position,  at  the  right  time,  a 
mass  of  troops  greater  than  your  enemy  can  there  oppose 
to  you. 

Principle  No.  1. —  To  i:>lace  masses  of  your  ariwj  in  contact 
with  fractions  of  i/our  enemy. 

Principle  Xo.  2. —  To  operate  as  much  as  possible  on  the 
rommunications  of  yovr  enemy  vithout  exposing  your  own. 

Principle  Xo.  3. —  To  opei-ate  always  on  interior  lines  {or 
shorter  ones  in  point  of  time). 

Every  true  maxim  in  war  can  be  deduced  from  the  above 
given  principles,  it  being  of  conr.se  understood  that  they 
are  to  be  reversed  in  speaking  of  the  operations  of  the 
enemy  —  i.  e.,  care  must  l)e  taken,  first,  to  prevent  your 
enemy  from  bringing  tlie  mass  of  his  forces  in  contact  with 
fractions  of  3'our  own,  or  large  fractions  against  small 
ones ;  second,  to  prevent  him  from  operating  on  your  com- 
munications Anthout  exposing  his  own  ;  third,  to  prevent 
his  moving  on  interior  or  .shorter  lines. 


These  three  [)riiiciples  supply  an  infallible  test  by  which 
to  judge  of  every  niilitaiy  plan :  for  no  combination  can 
be  well  conceived,  no  maxim  founded  in  truth,  which  is  at 
variance  with  them. 

By  operating-  ou  the  interior  lines  which  the  distribution 
of  your  adversary  atibrds  you,  you  may  march  against  one 
of  his  separated  fractions  with  your  whole  force,  aud  after 
destro3'ing  it  proceed  to  the  next,  aud  so  on ;  you  will  thus 
defeat  them  in  detail  by  bringing  the  mass  of  your  army 
in  contact  with  successive  fractions  of  your  enemy.  Prin- 
ciple 3  indicates  that  the  hostile  fraction  which  you  should 
tirst  attack  is  one  of  the  flanks,  since  it  will  take  the  enemy 
double  the  time  to  concentrate  his  whole  force  on  either 
flank  that  would  be  required  to  eifect  his  concentration  on 
the  centre. 

In  war  it  is  an  axiom  that  everj  possible  chance  of  success 
must  be  enlisted  on  your  side. 


MAXIMS. 

Maxim  1. — Kecer  abandon  your  lira:  of  corn.niunicati.on  from 
over-confidence. 

Maxim  2. — Although  it  is  a  maxim  never  to  abaiulon  your 
line  of  communication,  yet  to  change  that  line  is  one  of  tlie  ynost 
skilful  manoeuvres  of  the  art  of  loar,  where  circumstances  au- 
thorize it. 

Maxim  3. — If  you  march  to  the  conquest  of  a  coimtry  vjiih 
two  or  three  armies  ivhich  have  each  its  line  of  ojyeration  toward, 
a  fixed  point  where  they  are  to  unite,  it  is  a  niaxiin  that  the  union 
of  these  diff'ererd  corps  d'armee  must  never  take  place  near  the 
enemy,  because  not  only  may  the  enemy,  by  concent?'ating  his 
forces,  prevent  their  junction,  but  he  ynay  moreover  beat  them  in 
detail. 

The  route  by  which  an  army  marches  toward  its  object 


must  be  sheltered  bv  its  own  frontiers,  or  by  some  natural 
obstacle  throuffhout  as  great  an  extent  as  is  possible. 

That  part  of  the  base  of  operations  is  the  most  advan- 
tageous to  break  out  from  into  the  tlieatre  of  war  which 
conducts  the  most  directly  upon  the  enemy's  flank  or  rear. 

Maxim  4. — An  army  ought  to  have  but  one  line  of  operation, 
which  it  must  ca.refulbj  guard  and  never  abandon,  except  from  an 
overriding  necessity. 

Maxim  5. —  When  tiro  armies  are  ranged  in  battle,  and  one  of 
them  has  but  one  point  to  retreat  upon,  lohile  the  other  can  retreat 
on  all  the  points  of  the  coinpass,  all  the  advantage  is  with  the  last. 
It  is  in  such  a  case  that  a  commander  should  be  bold  to  strike 
great  blows,  and  manoeuvre  on  his  enemy's  flank.  Victory  is  in 
his  hands. 

Maxim  6. — It  is  one  of  the  most  imjjortant  jyrincij^les  of  war 
to  unite  the  scattered  bodies  of  an  army  at  the  point  which  is  the 
most  distant  and  the  best  protected,  from  the  attempts  of  an  eiiemy. 

Maxim  7. —  To  operate  by  lines  distant  from  each  other,  and 
without  intercommunication,  is  a  fault  which  generally  leads  to 
another.  The  advancing  columns  of  an  army  must  be  in  con- 
stant communication  with  each  other,  so  that  an  enemy  can  not 
pei\etrate  between  them. 

Maxim  8. —  The  communication  between  the  different  fractions 
of  an  army,  whether  in  jyosition  or  in  movement,  must  always  be 
perfectly  open  and  easy. 

MaxixM  9. —  To  besiege  a  fortified  place  ivhose  possession  v'oidd 
be  useless  to  yourself,  and  which  gives  the  enemy  no  power  of 
annoyance,  is  to  ivaste  time  and  means. 

The  places  which  an  invading  army  is  justified  in  besieg- 
ing are  such  as  come  Avithin  the  meaning  of  the  definitions 
of  strategetical  points  and  decisive  points. 

Every  point  on  the  theatre  of  war,  whatever  be  its  uat- 


6 

nre,  which  conduces  in  any  manner  to  strengthen  your  line 
of  operation  or  of  communication  is  a  strategetical  point 

Decisive  strategetical  points  are  those  only  which  are  deci- 
sive in  insuring  the  success  of  any  operations  of  strategy, 
either  for  oflence  or  defence. 

Maxim  10. —  The  excellence  of  a  position  is  alwa>/s  relative: 
1st.   To  that  occupied  hy  the  enemy. 
2d.   To  the  number  of  troops  intended  to  line  i^ 
3flf.    To  the  comp>osition  of  those  troojos. 

Maxim  11. — A  position  must  not  he  commanded  by  heights  in 
the  direction  of  the  enemy  within  artillery  range, 

Maxim  12. — Every  position  must  cover  the  line  of  communi- 
mtion  of  the  army  with  its  base. 

Maxim  13. —  The  lines  by  wldclt  the  army  must  retreat  from 
its  position,  if  defeated,  must  be  as  numerous  and  easy  as  p)Ossible. 

In  forming  a  line  of  battle,  special  respect  must  be  had 
to  the  line  or  lines  by  which  the  army  may  be  obliged  to 
retire.  The  more  directly  these  lead  toward  the  base  of 
operation  the  better.  The  more  of  these  lines  available, 
the  greater  the  security  in  which  the  army  will  fight,  and 
the  greater  the  probability  that,  if  defeated,  it  will  be  able 
to  effect  its  retreat  without  an}-  overwhelming  disaster. 

Maxim  14. —  The  part  or  parts  of  a  line  of  battle  which  are 
in  front  of  any  line  or  lines  of  retreat  must  be  made  the  strongest 
(if  not  so  already  from  natural  causes),  either  by  entrenchments  or 
by  posting  the  greatest  force  at  such  parts  of  your  line. 

If  the  enemy  attack  and  break  that  part  of  your  line 
which  is  in  front  of  your  line  of  retreat  j^our  army,  divided 
into  two  parts,  may  be  forced  back  toward  the  flanks,  and 
the  enemy  may  gain  possession  of  your  line  of  retreat. 

Maxim  15.— Every  position  must  afford  easy  communicationy 
in  rear  of  the  linCy  between  the  different  parts  of  your  line  of 
battle. 


Maxim  .16. —  The  ground  infiwii  of  your  position  should  be 
f'uch  as  to  impede  the  movements  of  an  enemy  adrancing  to  attack 
you,  and  should  be  so  completely  commanded  by  your  position  as 
to  insure  its  being  swept  by  your  artillery  to  thefidl  extent  of  its 
range. 

Siu'li  ground  will  be  more  slowly  traversed  by  the  enemy ; 
lie  will  be  exposed  for  a  longer  time  to  the  lire  of  your 
gnus,  which  \\\\\  luive  the  effect  of  disordering  his  march, 
and  damping  his  ardor  in  a  degree  proportioned  to  the- 
difficulty  of  the  ground  lie  has  to  pass  over. 

■  Maxim  17. — JErery  position  must  afford  secure  protection  to 
the  flanks  of  your  army. 

This  is  a  deduction  from  Principles  1  and  2,  since  its 
observance  will  prevent  the  enemy  from  applying  them  at 
3'our  expense — 

Principle  1,  by  placing  himself  in  such  a  position  as  will 
enable  him  to  attack  the  flank  of  your  line,  the  nature  of 
'which  manoeuvre  is  to  bring  masses  of  the  attacking  force 
in  contact  with  successive  fractions  of  the  line  attacked. 

Principle  2,  by  turning  your  flank  and  acting  on  your 
line  of  retreat. 

Strong  natural  obstacles  afford  the  best  protection,  such 
as  mountains,  large  rivers,  impenetrable  woods,  marshes, 
etc.  AVhere  these  do  not  exist  the  flanks  must  be  strength- 
ened b}'  artificial  means. 

Maxim  18, — A  position  cannot  be  too  strong;  lose  no  oppor- 
tunity of  strengthening  it  by  means  of  field-works. 

The  natural  positions  w'hicli  are  generally  met  with  can 
not  itrotect  an  army  from  the  attacks  of  a  superior  force 
witliout  the  aid  of  art. 

Maxim  19. — Orcupy  your  position  in  such  a  manner  that  you 
can  defend  a  part  of  it  with  a  snmller  force  than  that  which  the 
enemy  can  bring  against  it,  so  that  the  greater  part  of  your  force 
may  he  available  to  assad  the  weaker  of  the  enemy. 

If,  two  armies,  A  and  B,  of  20,000  men  each,   occupy 


lines  of  equal,  length ;  but  A,  by  reason  of  tlie  ground 
being  naturally  stronger  on  the  right  half  of  his  line,  rtr 
by  reason  of  entrenchments,  is  able  to  occupy  that  half 
effectively  with  only  5,000  men,  while  the  force  of  B  is 
equally  disseminated,  then  (to  use  a  technical  term)  the 
5.000  of  A  eontam  10,000  of  B ;  while  A  has  15,000  where- 
with to  overwhelm  the  opposing  10,000  of  B. 

If  your  force  is  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  j-ou  should 
r.ot  therefore  occupy  a  greater  front  than  that  of  the  enemy, 
l>ut  hold  your  surplus  troops  in  hand  ready  to  take  advan- 
tage of  any  opening  that  may  be  afforded.  You  will  thus 
be  able  to  insure  the  superiority  at  the  decisive  point  an-d 
time. 

If  A  and  B  consist  respectively  of  20,000  and  10.000 
men,  and  A  occupies  a  front  twice  as  extended  as  that  of 
B,  then  A  loses  the  advantage  of  numbers,  for  B  can  bring- 
to  bear  on  an  o[5posite  part  of  A's  line  a  force  equal  to 
that  which  can  oppose  it,  and  that  part  may  be  broken 
before  succor  from  the  distant  portions  of  A's  line  can 
arrive. 

It  must  never  be  forgotten  that  it  is  not  the  number  of 
troops  ranged  in  order  of  battle  which  decides  the  victory,  hut  the 
number  which  is  actually  put  in  vigorous  action  hg  a  commander. 

Maxim  20. —  When  on  the  eve  of  a  battle  recall  all  your 
d.etaclmients  ;  do  not  neglect  one,  however  small :  one  battalion  the 
more  sometimes  decides  the  day. 

In  the  same  manner  as  no  part  of  a  position  can  be  too 
strong,  a  master  of  the  art  of  war  will  never  consider  that 
he  has  too  many  troops,  no  matter  how  small  may  be  his 
enemy's  force. 

Maxim  11.— Never  detach  a  force,  either  on  the  eve  or  on  the      j 
day  of  a  battle,  for  the  purpose  of  co-operating  tvith  your  mail). 
body  in  attacJdng  the  enemy,  unless  your  commurdcations  with  the 
detachment  can  be  constantly  maintained. 


Unless  communication  is  maintained,  there  can   be  no 


concert.  Xotliing  should  be  ]oft  to  accident.  If  a  force 
be  detached  to  such  a  distance  that  its  communication  with 
the  main  body  is  not  constant  and  rapid^  however  well  a 
combination  may  be  conceived,  a  thousand  accidents  may 
disconcert  it. 

If  a  bod}'  of  troops  be  detached  to  a  distance  from  the 
main  army  round  a  flank  of  the  enemy,  for  the  purpose  of 
attacking  the  enemy  in  rear  in  an  approaching  battle,  a 
watchful  enemy  will  learn  the  movement  and  overwhelm 
the  detachment. 

Maxim  22. — Never  leave  intervals  hetivecn  the  different  divis- 
ions of  your  line  of  battle  ivhere  the  enemy  might  penetrate^ 
unless  to  draw  him  into  a  snare. 

It  results  as  a  corollary  from  the  last  maxim,  that  you 
must  never  weaken  any  part  of  your  line  to  such  an  extent 
that  a  vigorous  attack  upon  it  by  the  enem}^  will  probably 
succeed,  and  enable  him  to  act  as  has  been  above  de- 
scribed ;  also  that,  unless  you  have  a  great  superiority  of 
force,  it  is  dangerous  to  attack  an  enemy's  line  by  both 
extremities  at  once;  for,  as  both  attacks  must  be  reinforced 
at  the  expense  of  your  centre,  your  centre  becomes  weak- 
en(Kl,  and  a  counter-attack  upon  it  by  the  enemy  may  suc- 
ceed. 

^Iaxim  '1'^. — Never  attack  with  a  fraction  of  your  force  when 
a  short  delay  will  enable  you  to  attack  with  masses. 

The  temptation  or  supposed  necessity  may  sometimes  be 
great,  but  yielding  to  it  will  almost  invariably  increase  the 
evil  it  is  intended  to  remedy. 

Maxim  24. — Nothing  can  be  more  rash  or  contrary  to  the 
principles  of  war  than  to  make  a  flank  march  before  an  enemy  in 
posUio7i. 

Maxim  25. —  There  are  two  icays  of  obliging  an  enemy  to 
abandon  a  position,  viz :  by  attacking  and  driving  him  from  it, 
and  by  manceuvring  so  as  to  make  it  impossible  for  him  to  hold  it. 


10 

The  first  luethod  should  onl\'  be  adopted  when,  in  con- 
sequence of  your  liaving  a  superior  force,  or  of  the  enem3''s 
position  being  faulty,  it  is  your  object  to  bring  on  a  decisive 
engagement. 

The  mode  of  applying  the  second  is  in  general  to  threaten 
the  enemy's  line  of  communication. 

Maxim  26. — An  attack  on  the  enemy's  centre,  if  successful,  is 
in  general  the  most  decisive.  That  on  a  flank  is  the  most 
sec\ire. 

The  centre  of  a  line  is  not  only  the  strongest  naturally, 
from  its  position  enabling  it  to  be  doubly  reinforced  from 
each  wing  in  half  the  time  required  to  reinforce  one  wing 
from  the  other,  but,  in  addition,  its  strength  is  artificially 
increased  by  every  possible  means;  the  fire  of  the  guns  of  a 
position  likewise,  all  converging  on  the  ground  over  which 
the  enemy  must  advance  to  attack  the  centre,  renders  th6 
attack  on  that  point  more  doubtful  than  one  upon  a  flank. 
As  a  general  rule  the  attack  of  a  position  should.be  made 
on  the  weakest  points,  or  on  points  which  are  so  decisive 
that  an  attack  upon  any  other  is  impossible  or  dangerous, 
so  long  as  they  remain  in  the  enemy's  possession. 

The  weakest  points  are  the  flanks  when  not  supported, 
or  any  salient  points  of  the  enemy's  line  which  are  not 
w^ell  defended  by  his  artillery  in  position,  or  any  point 
of  his  line  where  he  has  left  an  interval,  or  which  he  has 
not  occupied  in  sufficient  force. 

In  choosing  a  point  of  attack,  one  should  be  preferred 
from  which  the  assailants,  if  repulsed,  may  with  safety 
retreat,  rather  than  another  which  may  ofter  greater  temp- 
tations to  attack,  but  the  line  of  retreat  from  which  would 
be  exposed. 

Maxim  27. — If  your  enemy  is  entrenching  and  it  is  your 
intention  to  attack  his  position,  do  not  delay  a  moment.  Every 
hour's  delay  may  cost  the  loss  of  1,000  inen  in  an  assault. 

Maxim  28. — Aii  army  on  the  inarch  and  an  army  in  position 


ii 

in  an  eneyiufs  countri/,  sJtoidd  never  be  for  one  moment  without 
its  advanced  guard  and  its  advanced  posts. 

There  are  two  descriptions  of  advanced  posts,  viz:  those 
which  are  to  be  maintained  against  attack  to  the  hist,  and 
those  which  are  onlv  to  be  defended  sufficiently  long  to 
enable  the  army  they  cover  to  form  in  order  of  battle 
before  an  enemy  can  attack  it. 

iSTo  precaution,  therefore,  which  will  strengthen  such 
posts  and  enable  the  defenders  to  keep  the  enemy  at  bay, 
if  only  for  five  minutes,  should  be  neglected.  An  officer 
is  not  worthy  of  the  name  who,  in  command  of  an  outpost, 
does  not  feel  that  the  safety  of  the  whole  army  jnay  de- 
pend on  his  individual  vigilance,  who  neglects  anj'  possible 
expedient  to  strengthen  his  post,  and  who  does  not  make 
himself  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  ground  to  a  con- 
siderable distance  around  it,  asking  .himself  frequentlv 
what  he  should  do  if  attacked. 

MaxIxM  29, —  7o  defend  a  defile,  never  take  post  in  front,  hat 
ahcays  in  rear  of  the  defile. 

This  will  enable  the  defenders  to  attack  with  their  whole 
force  any  fraction  of  the  enemy  they  may  think  proper  to 
allow  to  emerge  from  the  defile. 

Xo  position,  however  good  otherwise,  should  be  occupied 
b\'  an  arm}-  which  has  a  defile  in  its  rear  through  which 
the  arm}'  must  retreat  if  defeated.  A  retreat  through  a 
defile  before  an  enemy  is  always  disastrous. 

The  case  of  an  army  defending  the  head  of  a  bridge  is 
an  exception  to  this. 

It  follows  that  you  should  never  lose  an  opportunity  of 
attacking  an  enemy  in  retreat,  while  in  the  act  of  passing 
a  defile,  allowing  any  portion  of  his  army  you  think  proper 
to  enter  it,  and  then  attacking  with  your  whole  force  the 
remaining  fraction. 

All  passes  over  mountains  are  of  the  nature  of  defiles. 

A  bridge  is  essentially  a  defile;  and,  in  the  same  way  as 
important  passes  are  defended  by  forts,  a  bridge  over  a 
great  river  is  defended  by  fortifications  of  more  or  less 
strength. 


Maxim  oO. — Every  disadvantage  may  he  removed  by  skill  or 
fortune,  except  time.  If  a  General  has  time  against  him,  he 
must  fail.     And  conversely,  time  is  the  best  ally. 

Maxim  31. — As  a  general  rule  the  column  of  divi^sions  is  the 
most  convenient  order  of  march;  the  line  is  the  best  formation  for 
collision. 

Every  rule  in  war  may,  if  true,  be  traced  to  one  of  the 
three  principles.  The  present  is  derived  from  ITo.  1,  as  by 
attacking  lines  with  columns,  the  greater  number  of  the 
men  composing  the  column  are  unable  either  to  fire  or  act 
offensively  in  any  manner,  while  every  man  in  the  line  can 
be  brought  into  play,  thus  bringing  the  greater  number  of 
the  line  in  contact  with  the  smaller  of  the  column. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  no  rule  can  be  absolute  in 
war;  every  one  is  subject  to  modification  from  actual  cir- 
cumstances. Although  the  column  is  the  most  convenient 
order  of  march  general]}',  and  the  only  ,safe  order  when 
exposed  to  cavalry  attack,  it  is  not  always  the  safest. 

Maxim  32. — All  movements  of  troops  must  he  made  in  such  a 
manner  as  will  expose  them  to  the  least  possible  amount  of  injury 
from  an  enemy. 

Therefore,  in  the  case  where  troops  advancing  to  attack 
an  enemy's  position  are  exposed  to  the  fire  of  a  powerful 
artillery,  the  advance  should  be  made  in  line. 

Maxim  33. — All  movements  in  presence  of  an  enemy  must  hi' 
made  in  that  order  which  will  admit  of  the  formation  of  the  H/k 
of  battle  in  the  sJiortest  possible  time. 

This  maxim  is  peculiarly  applicable  to  a  flank  march 
within  reach  of  an  enemy,  or  to  a  movement  whose  object 
is  to  prolong  one  flank.  In  moving  to  the  front  when 
threatened  by  cavalry,  the  march  is  executed  in  column  at 
quarter-distance,  because  from  that  formation  the  order  of 
battle  is  assumed  in  the  shortest' possible  time  (viz:  that  of 
the  square). 

In  moving  to  a  flank  within  reach  of  an  enemy,  where 


13 

cavalry  attack  is  not  imminent,  or  where  sufficient  protec- 
tion is  afforded  by  the  cavahy  of  the  army  so  moving,  the 
marcli  sliouh.l  be  executed  in  column  at  full  distance,  be- 
cause (the  line  liaving  been  established  as  the  proper  order 
for  collision  —  see  Maxim  31),  from  that  formation,  line  is 
formed  with  the  least  possible  delay  by  a  simple  wheel  of 
divisions  into  line. 

When  it  is  desired  to  prolong  a  line  to  one  flank  to  a 
comparativel}'  small  extent,  it  may  be  done  by  the  march 
of  successive  battalions  or  brigades  from  the  other  flank  in 
rear  of  the  line.  The  flank  march  is  in  this  case  protected 
and  concealed  by  the  general  lino. 

When  time  presses,  the  same  object  may  be  accomplished 
by  moving  up  to  the  flank  of  the  first  line  the  nearest  bat- 
talions or  l)rigades  of  the  second  line,  making  a  simulta- 
neous flank  movement  of  the  second  line  to  a  suflicient 
extent  to  cover  the  prolongation  of  the  first,  and  supplying 
its  deficiency  on  the  other  fiank  by  battalions  or  brigades 
drawn  from  the  first  line. 

^Iaxim  34. — Of  all  the  attacks  to  which  a  body  of  troops  can 
be  exposed,  that  upon  a  fiank  is  the  most  dangerous. 

This  is  deduced  from  Principle  1.  For,  suppose  a  battal- 
ion in  line,  which  we  may  call  A,  to  be  attacked  by  another 
line,  B.  which  has  succeeded  in  establishing  itself  perpen- 
dicularly to  the  direction  of  A,  on  one  of  its  flanks.  The 
commander  of  A  will  endeavor  to  change  his  front  so  as 
to  form  a  line  parallel  to  B,  in  order  to  meet  its  attack. 
Should  B  be  at  a  suflicient  distance  to  enable  A  to  com- 
plete its  change  of  front,  no  inconvenience:. will  ensue ;  but 
if  notj  only  a  part  of  A  will  have  been  able  to  assume  the 
required  parallel  formation  at  the  time  when  it  is  attacked 
by  B's  whole  force,  and  driven  back  on  the  remaining 
divisions  of  the  battalion,  which  will  be  attacked  and  over- 
thrown by  B  in  succession. 

The  most  advantageous  direction  which  a  line  can  as- 
sume for  the  purpose  of  attacking  another  line  in  flank  is 
perpendicular  to  that  of  the  line  to  be  attacked;  and  the 
more  nearly  perpendicular  the  greater  is  the  advantage. 


u 

The  attack  on  the  head  of  a  column  is  analogous  to  that 
on  the  ilank  of  a  line;  but  it  is  more  ruinous  in  its  eftects. 

The  echelon  formation  combines  to  a  certain  extent  the 
advantages  of  the  line  and  column.  For  mere  changes  of 
position,  the  movement  in  oblique  echelon  saves  much 
time.  For  an  advance  against  an  enemy  in  position,  the 
direct  echelon  formation  presents  advantages  attbrded  by 
no  other.  It  combines  the  greater  correctness  of  the  march 
in  column  with  the  superior  force,  for  collision,  of  the  line. 

The  head  of  the  echelon  is  the  only  part  the  enemy  can 
attack  without  exposing  his  own  flank.  The  retired  flank 
can  only  be  turned  by  a  long  march  on  the  part  of  the 
eneni}-;  it  may  therefore  be  considered  safe,  and  the  ad- 
vanced wing,  with  which  you  first  attack,  may  be  reinforced 
at  the  expense  of  that  which  is  retired.  Thus,  in  less  than 
the  time  Avhich  would  be  required  by  the  enemy  to  turn 
the  retired  flank,  you  may  gain  some  decided  advantage 
with  the  other. 

In  general  terms,  the  adv^antages  of  the  echelon  forma- 
tion are  that  one  flank  is  therebj-  secure  from  attack  — 
each  division  of  the  echelon  covers  the  flank  of  that  which 
precedes  it,  and  the  exposed  flank  may  be  reinforced  at  the 
expense  of  the  other;  thereby  observing  Maxim  19,  since, 
by  reason  of  the  distance  Avhich  separates  them,  one  wing 
of  the  enemy  is  held  in  check  by  the  retired  wing  of  the 
echelon,  which  has  been  weakened  in  order  to  reinforce 
the  head  of  the  echelon  which  is  the  point  of  collision. 

The  retired  flank  being  safe,  it  remains  only  to  secure 
the  head  of  the  echelon  from  flank  attack. 

In  case  of  there  being  no  flank  support  for  the  head  of 
the  echelon,  the  greater  part  of  the  artillery  and  cavalry 
must  support  that  flank. 

If  two  armies  of  equal  strength  are  opposed  to  each 
other,  and  one  of  them  has  its  flanks  strongly  posted,  while 
one  or  both  of  the  flanks  of  the  other  are  unsupported,  the 
general  line  of  the  last  may  be  parallel  to  that  of  the  flrst, 
and  the  exposed  flank  or  flanks  may  be  protected  by  several 
bodies  of  troops  being  posted  in  echelon  to  their  rear;  the 


15 

enemy  dare  not  attack  the  exposed  flank,  because  his  own 
flank  would  be  in  danger  from  the  troops  in  echelon,  and 
he  could  not  make  a  long  flank  march  to  turn  the  flank  of 
those  troops  Avithout  exposing  his  line  of  retreat. 

Frederick's  system  was  to  attack  one  wing  of  his  enemy's 
army  with  one  of  his  own  wings,  reinforced  for  that  pur- 
pose at  the  expense  of  the  other,  remedying  the  weakness 
of  his  other  wing  by  removing  it  beyond  the  reach  of  at- 
tack. He  formed  his  line  obliquely  to  that  of  the  enemy, 
and  then  marched  in  the  prolongation  of  his  own  line  until 
he  outflanked  the  wing  he  designed  to  attack. 

When  an  army  from  the  parallel  order  assumes  tlie 
oblique  order  with  respect  to  an  enemy,  the  flrst  consid- 
eration must  be  the  line  of  retreat.  The  usual  means  of 
efl:ecting  the  change  is  by  keeping  one  flank  in  its  original 
position  and  throwing  back  the  other. 

The  general  of  an  army  which  has  eftected  such  a 
change  of  front  should,  as  a  general  rule,  post  the  greater 
strength  of  his  second  line  in  rear  of  his  advanced  wing, 
and  hold  his  reserve  somewhere  behind  the  centre  of  tliat 
wing. 

Such  a  change  of  position,  however,  in  presence  of  a 
watchful  and  able  enemy  ought  to  be  impossible;  and  it  is 
only  by  surprise  that  a  general  can  hope  to  place  his  army 
en  7nassc  in  a  position  to  attack  one  of  his  enemy's  flanks. 

In  order  to  attempt  successfully  the  oblique  order  by  a 
flank  march  in  the  neighborhood  of  an  enemy,  the  march 
of  the  army  must  be  concealed  from  the  eneni}-. 

The  line  of  retreat  of  the  army  which  takes  the  oblique 
order  must  always  be  in  rear  of  the  advanced  wing. 

The  greater  the  obliquity  of  the  army  to  the  enemy's 
line  the  greater  the  security  of  the  refused  flank  from 
counter-attack,  and  the  greater  the  probability  of  success. 
And  this  only  brings  us  to  the  perfection  of  flank  attack, 
which  is  when  the  direction  of  the  army  is  perpendicular 
to  that  of  the  enemy. 

If  an  enemy  endeavQrs  to  turn  one  of  your  flanks  by 
moving  his  whole  army  to  that  flank  there  are  several 
modes  of  defeating  his  intention. 


1st.  If  he  marches  in  such  an  order  that  he  can  not  read- 
ily resume  his  line  of  battle  facing  your  army,  make  a 
visrorous  attack  on  tlie  flank  of  his  march  alono-  his  whole 
line. 

2d.  If  he  marches  as  above  in  loose  order,  so  as  to  leave 
any  large  interval  between  the  different  divisions  of  his 
army,  attack  one  of  the  separated  portions  —  suppose  the 
rear  portion — by  interposing  a  body  of  troops  between  it 
and  the  rest  of  the  army,  to  stop  the  head  of  its  march 
while  you  direct  other  troops  against  the  flank  of  its 
march. 

3d.  If, he  marches  compactly,  and  in  such  an  order  as 
will  enable  him  to'  reform  his  line  in  a  moment,  3'ou  must 
choose  the  head  or  the  rear  of  his  line  of  march  for  attack; 
but  the  attack  must  be  made  with  method  and  supported 
by  cavalry,  or  tlie  enemy's  cavalry  (which  Avill  be  found  at 
both  those  points)  will  take  your  infantry  in  flank. 

4th.  You  may  prolong  your  line  to  the  threatened  flank 
by  either  of  the  methods  already  given,  and  turn  the  tables 
on  the  enemy  by  outflanking  him. 

The  eftective  force  of  an  army  in  battle  depends  chiefly 
on  the  rapidity  and  precision  with  which  it  can  manoeuvre ; 
and  the  basis  of  its  excellence  in  this  particular  is  found  in 
the  proficiency  of  each  battalion  and  squadron  in  field 
movements.  The  effective  force  of  an  army  in  a  campaign 
depends  mainly  on  the  i-egularity  and  rapidity  with  which 
its  marches  are  conducted;  and  as  the  success  of  an  action 
may  often  be  influenced  b}' the  order  of  march  in  which 
an  army  approaches  an  enem_y  in  position,  it  is  impossible 
that  the  troops  can  be  too  much  practised  in  every  possible 
order  of  march. 

In  all  armies,  ancient  and  modern,  the  line  of  battle  has 
been  divided  into  units,  whose  magnitude  has  been  deter- 
mined by  the  average  range  of  the  human  voice.  The 
unit  should  be  as  large  as  is  consistent  with  the  possibility 
of  the  men  composing  it,  when  formed  in  line,  being  di- 
rected by  the  voice  of  their  commjmder. 

The  battalion  is  taken  as  the  unit  of  the  infantry  line. 


IT 

The  squadron  and  the  batteiy  as  that  of  the  cavahy  and 
artillery  respective!}-. 

Ill  our  army  500  men  in  two  ranks  form  a  line  of  about 
150  yards,  as  many  as  are  usually  found  in  the  field, 
supernumeraries  and  non-effectives  being  taken  into  ac- 
count: i.  e.,  3-J  men  to  one  yard,'or  5,867  to  one  mile;  or 
5,000  men  to  one  mile,  allowing  for  space  between  regi- 
ments, etc. ;  a  greater  extent  of  line  might  be  inconvenient, 
although  it  is  certain  that  in  an  attack  the  larger  the  mass 
to  which  unity  of  impulse  can  be  communicated  without 
confusion  the  greater  will  be  the  chances  of  success. 

The  art  of  directing  troops  in  battle  consists  in  the  just 
employment  of  the  three  arms  in  such  a  manner  that  they 
shall  mutually  support  and  defend  each  other  to  as  great 
an  extent  as  possible.  No  fixed  rule  can  be  laid  down  as 
to  their  relative  proportion  in  the  composition  of  an  army. 
That  must  depend  very  much  on  the  nature  of  the  country 
in  which  an  army  operates. 

But  where  such  country  is  favorable  to  tlie  march  and 
action  of  those  arms,  a  good  proportion  is — 

Cavalry,  one-fifth  of  the  infantry ;  artillery,  three  guns 
for  every  thousand  men  of  infantry  and  cavahy  united. 

Nothing  can  be  more  opposed  to  the  rules  of  war  than 
for  infantry  alone  to  attack  an  enemy's  infantry  in  position 
which  is  defended  by  artillery.  The  fire  of  the  latter  will 
throw  the  attacking  force  into  confusion,  and  will  expose 
it  to  an  easy  overthrow  if  it  should  succeed  in  reaching  the 
position  to  be  assaulted. 

When  an  officer  is  on  active  service  in  the  field,  every- 
thing connected  with  the  daily  life  of  his  men"  should  be 
an  object  of  constant  attention  ;  no  detail  is  beneath  him. 
He  must  not  think  the  arms  and  ammunition  his  most 
important  chaj'ge,  and  that  if  they  be  in  fighting  order  he 
need  not  trouble  himself  much  about  the  rest. 

The  arms  are  the  fighting  weapons,  but  the  soldier  is  the 

machine  which  wields  them ;  and  it  is  to  him — to  clothino: 

his  back,  and  feeding  his  belly,  and  looking  after  his  health 

and  comfort  —  that  the  great  attention  is  due.     The  arms 

2 


18 

and  ammunition  must  of  course  be  alwa3"S  in  perfect  order, 
but  tbey  are  onh'  required  when  in  contact  with  an  enemy. 
The  natural  condition  of  a  soldier  on  service  is  the  line  of 
march.,  He  will  have  at  least  twenty  da3's  marching  to 
one  of  fighting;  and  he  has  to  be  preserved  in  health  and 
comfort  during  those  twcnt}-  days,  otherwise  his  musket 
and  pouch  Avould  do  small  service  on  the  twenty-first  day. 

An  ofiieer  should  go  among  his  men  and  himse|f  look 
after  their  comfort.  jN'o  fear  of  their  losing  respect  for 
him  because  he  does  so.  At  the  end  of  a  march,  he  should 
never  feel  at  libert}'  to  attend  to  his  own  wants  until  he 
has  seen  his  men  engaged  in  cooking  their  meals.  The 
rapidity  with  which  a  regiment  has  its  fires  lighted  after  a 
march,  and  meals  cooked,  may  be  regarded  as  a  test  of  the 
attention  paid  by  the  officers  to  the.  comfort  of  their  men. 

Similarly  before  a  march,  an  officer  should  take  care  that 
none  of  his  men  leave  their  encampment  or  bivouac  with- 
out as  good  a  meal  as  circumstances  permit. 

As  regards  equipment  for  the  field,  an  officer  must  have 
as  few  wants  as  possible  ;  and  he  should  carefully  study 
the  art  of  putting  up  the  articles  it  is  necessary  he  should 
possess  in  the  smallest  possible  compass.  The  line  of 
march  must  be  considered  as  the  natural  condition  of  a 
soldier,  and  everything  regulated  with  that  view. 

An  officer  charged  with  the  arrangement  of  any  military 
movement  or  operation  should  on  no  account  trust  to  the 
intelligence  of  subordinates  who  are  to  execute  it.  He 
should  anticipate  and  provide  against, every  misconception 
or  stupidity  it  is  possible  to  foresee,  and  give  all  the  mi- 
nute directions  he  would  think  necessary  if  he  knew  the 
officer  charged  with  the  execution  of  the  operation  to  be 
the  most  stupid  of  mankind. 

No  amount  of  disapprobation  of  his  geng^al's  plans  can 
justify  an  officer  in  canvassing  those  plans  with  others,  and 
openly  finding  fault  with  them.  A  great  many  young 
gentlemen  (and  old  gentlemen  too,  for  that  matter)  set 
up  for  generals,  and  habitually  ridicule  the  dispositions  of 
their  superiors.     Such  a  practice  is  insubordinate  and  mis- 


19 

chievous  in  the  highest  degree ;  the  soldiers  ^acquire  the 
habit  from  those  whose  duty  it  is  to  set  an  example  ;  they 
lose  that  confidence  in  their  general  which  is  one  of  the 
principal  elements  of  success  in  .military  operations,  and 
infinite  mischief  results. 


.«",' 


OUTPOST  SERVICE. 


1.  The  commanders  of  all  detached  army  corps,  divis- 
ions, brigades,  or  regiments  of  this  army,  on  arriving  at  a 
position  to  be  occupied,  will  carefully  reconnoitre,  person- 
ally and  by  staft"  officers,  the  ground  in  the  vicinity,  and 
all  roads  and  approaches  thereto,  for  a  distance  of  several 
miles,  especially  in  the  known  direction  of  the  enemy. 
The  best  positions  for  holding  all  such  approaches  under 
vigilant  observation,  and  for  the  prevention  of  surprise, 
will  be  carefully  selected  for  the  advanced  line  of  picket 
sentries,  which  shall  not  be  less  than  one  mile  distant  froiii 
the  main  body  of  the  command,  nor  more  than  three  miles. 
The  force  to  be  employed  in  this  outpost,  service  shall 
habitually  be  not  less  than  one-lifth  of  the  command  from 
which  it  may  be  detached,  and  the  tour  of  duty  will  be  for 
three  days. 

2.  The  post  of  the  regiment,  battalion,  or  detachment 
on  outpost  service,  will  be  selected  at  a  convenient  central 
point,  about  half  a  mile  in  rear  of  the  front  line  to  be 
occupied  by  sentinels;  and  there  will  be  the  reserve,  and 
place  for  baggage  and  cooking.  One-third  of  the  com- 
mand or  detachment  will  be  thrown  forward  in  three  equal 
parties,  equidistant  from  each  other,  to  within  two  hun- 
dred yards  of  the  extreme  picket  front;  and  from  these 
detachments  smaller  detachments,  each  of  from  three  to 
six  privates,  with  a  commissioned  or  non-commissioned 
officer  in  charge,  from  which  a  continuous  line  of  sentries 
will  be  established  along  the  entire  front  to  be  held  and 
observed,  connecting  at  all  times  with  the  sentinels  on  the 
right  and  left,  thrown  forward  either  by  the  pickets,  posts 


21 

of  tlie  same  regiment,  battalion,  or  detacliment,  or  estab- 
lished from  other  regiments,  battalions,  or  detachments  on 
outpost  service.  At  night  the  number  of  sentinels  will  be 
doubled. 

3.  Sentinels  on  picket  should  be  so  established  as  to 
observe  as  much,  and  as  far,  as  possible,  while  themselves 
concealed  from  observation  by  the  enemy.  Loud  talking, 
singing,  whistling,  and  fires,  except  at  the  reserve — and,  in 
very  cold  weather,  on  the  line  of  company  or  detacliment 
reserves  —  is  strictly  prohibited.  Citizens  must  not  be 
allowed  to  stay  or  lounge  about  the  picket  posts,  or  con- 
verse with  pickets;  this  is  particularly  enjoined:  for,  under 
the  pretence. of  hospitality,  and  the  simulation  of  the  sim~ 
pie  countryman,  an  insidious  spy  may  be  lurking  to  dis- 
cover our  signals  of  recognition,  countersigns,  passwords, 
or  other  information,  to  be  betrayed  to  our  injury. 

4.  Officers,  and  non-commissioned  officers  and  soldiers, 
on  picket  service,  are  at  all  times  dressed  and  equipped. 
The  commander  of  each  outpost  command  will  make  fre- 
quent visits  and  inspections  of  his  advanced  detachments, 
picket  posts,  and  front  line  of  sentinels;  and  he  will  be 
responsible  for  any  surprise  of  his  lines,  or  lax,  negligent 
performance  of  picket  service  by  his  officers  and  men 
during  the  tour,  lie  will  give  proper  instructions  to  all 
under  his  command,  touching  their  several  duties,  and 
should  satisfy  himself  that  those  instructions  are  well  un- 
derstood and  rigidly  executed.  His  adjutant,  or  some 
other  officer  selected  for  the  duty,  will  also  visit  each  picket 
post  and  sentry  once  each  night,  between  twelve  o'clock 
and  daylight. 

5.  When  a  day  signal  of  recognition  has  been  arranged 
for  any  picket  line,  it  will  be  demanded  as  soon  as  the 
parties  see  each  other.  At  night  parties  approaching  will 
be  halted  at  a  distance  of  sixty  yards,  if  practicable,  in  a 
loud,. distinct  tone,  and  the  signal  demanded.  The  party 
challenged  will  then  require  a  response  from  the  challeng- 
ing party;  this  made,  the  latter  will  order  the  former  to 
advance  and  give  the  countersign.     Commanders  of  out- 


22 

posts  will  be  careful  not  to  prevent  nor  clela}^  tlie  passin'g  of 
cavalry  pickets,  or  couriers  with  despatches;  but  when 
reasonable  doubts  arise  as  to  the  character  of  the  party,  ho 
must  be  sent,  under  charge  of  guard,  at  once  to  the  head- 
quarters of  the  nearest  general  officer.  A  mounted  man 
will  not  be  required  to  dismount  to  give  the  countersign, 
after  having  made  the  proper  signal,  nor  will  the  counter- 
sign be  required  in  the  daytime.  Great  circumspection 
must  be  exercised  in  the  use  of  signals,  to  prevent  their 
observation  by  lurking  spies  of  the  enemy. 

6.  An  approach  of  the  enemy  must  be  resisted  by  the 
pickets  as  obstinately  as  practicable;  the  ground  must  only 
be  yielded  before  an  overwhelming  force ;  they  will  then 
retire,  fighting,  on  the  reserve,  where  a  stand  will  be  made 
as  long  as  practicable.  If  forced  to  retire,  they  will  take 
up  successive  positions  behind  all  advantageous  shelter, 

,and  resolutely  check  and  retard  the  advance  of  the  enemy 
as  long  as  possible.  The  best  marksmen  will  be  selected 
to  cover  the  rear,  while  thus  falling  back,  who  will  fire 
with  deliberation  as  they  retire.  If  pressed  closely  by  the 
enemy,  the  command  must  be  brought,  if  possible,  to 
charge  jvith  the  bayonet.  The  utmost  care  must  be  taken 
to  prevent  the  men  from  crowding  m  masse,  in  falling  back, 
as  they  will  offer  a  target  for  artillery ;  and  the  men  must 
be  cautioned  against,  and  prevented  from  making,  a  precip- 
itate retreat  from  an  outpost,  under  any  circumstances. 

7.  While  on  outpost  duty,  no  officer  or  soldier  will  be 
permitted  to  leave  the  outpost,  without  express  authority 
from  the  commander,  except  upon  a  surgeon's  certificate. 
Commanders  of  outposts  must  remain  constantly  during 
the  tour  with  their  reserve,  except  when  visiting  the  picket 
posts  and  sentries,  in  which  case,  they  will  leave  these 
instructions  with  the  officer  next  in  command. 

8.  In  marching  to  and  from  outposts,  the  utmost  order 
and  discipline  will  be  preserved.  No  siraggliiif/  must  be 
permitted. 

■  .  9.  As  soon  as  the  pickets  may  become  seriously  engaged 
with'  the  enemy,  any  baggage  at  the  post  of  the  reserve 


23 

will  be  immecliatelj  sent  to  the  rear,  to  the  baggage  of  the 
brigade  to  which  the  detachment  belongs.  Troops  on  out- 
post service  are  expected  to  bivouac. 

10.  As  soon  as  the^  enemy  shall  have  developed  with  cer- 
tainty a  design  to  advance,  the  commanders  of  outpost> 
will  at  once  despatch  couriers  to  the  general  commanding 
the  corps  or  division  to  which  the  outpost  belongs,  giving 
information  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  his  probable 
strength,  kind  of  force,  and  wliether  moving  rapidly  or 
not,  route  or  routes  taken,  and  such  other  information  as 
may  be  of  service.  The  report  of  mere  rumored  move- 
ments must  always  be  avoided,  or  at  least  distinguished 
from  what  may  be  ascertained  by  the  military. 

11.  The  comnuindcr  of  each  outpost  will  publish  these 
orders  every  tour,  before  establishing  his  picket  post  or 
posting  his  picket  sentries;  they  will  likewise  be  read  to 
each  companj' or  detachment  of  the  line  ofiidvanced  picket 
parties.  They  will  be  carefully  preserved,  and  transferred 
to  the  next  commanders  of  the  outpost. 

12.  Any  person  found  in  the  act  of  eluding  the  outposts, 
and  failing  to  halt  when  directed  to  do  so,  will  be  fired 
upon  by  the  sentinels;  and  any  person,  if  suspected  of 
eluding  the  outposts,  will  be  at  once  arrested  and  sent  to 
the  nearest  provost  marshal. 

13.  Cavalry  pickets  will  be  required,  by  sentries  and 
picket  posts,  to  show  authority  of  their  colonel  or  other 
commander  for  the  service  before  being  allowed  to  pass  ; 
and  couriers,  with  despatches,  must  be  furnished  with 
passes  properly  signed. 

14.  The  roll  of  troops  at  outposts  must  be  called  fre- 
quently during  the  day,  and  at  retreat  there  shall  be  an 
inspection  of  arms  and  ammunition. 

15.  Staft'  officers  may  be  sent  b}'  the  general,  or  other 
officer  in  command,  to  inspect  the  outposts  of  his  com- 
mand. 

16.  Sentries  must  alwa3-s  be  ready  to  iire,  but  will  be 
sure  of  the  presence  of  the  enemy  before  firing,  and  will 
carefully  avoid  false  alarms.     Once  satisfied  that  the  enemy 


24 

is  at  hand,  the  sentinel,  though  all  defence  on  his  part 
may  be  useless,  must  fire,  as  the  safet}'  of  the  army  may 
depend  on  the  alarm  he  will  then  give.  Picket  sentries 
should  be  relieved  every  hour  at  night,  and,  as  a  precaution 
against  surprise,  should  be  instructed  in  some  signal  for 
the  night  before  giving  the  countersign  to  others  of  the 
same  outpost  detachment. 

17.  In  the  immediate  or  near  presence  xDf  the  eneni}^  the 
main  and  company'  reserves  must  stand  to  their  arms  for 
an  hour  immediately  before  daybreak.  Patrols  will  be 
made  slowly,  silently,  and  with  the  utmost  precaution,  to 
insure  against  surprise  or  being  mistaken  for  the  enemy 
by  our  own  men.  When  patrols  are  sent  out  information 
of  the  fact  must  be  spread  throughout  the  picket  posts  and 
sentries. 


CAVALRY  PICKETS   AND  VEDETTES. 

18.  In  addition  to  infantry  outposts,  the  wdiole  front  of 
any  force  in  position  or  camp  must  be  completely  observed 
and  covered  by  cavalry ;  all  commanding  points  of  obser- 
vation will  be  occupied ;  and  all  possible  avenues  of  ap- 
proach will  be  watched,  as  near  to  the  enemy's  lines  as 
the  nature  of  the  country  will  admit,  or  he  will  permit 
without  substantial  resistance.  Positions  must  be  avoided 
which  the  enemy  can  approach  under  cover  or  turn.  There 
must  be  an  unbroken  line  of  conmiunication  on  the  right 
and  left,  between  all  the  posts  and  vedettes.  The  horse 
should  be  relieved  by  his  rider  as  much  as  possible,  but 
when  near  the  eneyny  the  vedette  must  never  quit  his^rcin  or 
take  off  bridle  or  saddle. 

19.  Cavalry  picket  detachments,  when  practicable,  will 
consist  of  entire  companies,  and  each  companj-  will  cover 
its  proportion  of  the  front  to  be  occupied.  The  picket 
posts,  detached  in  advance,  will  not  be  of  less  than  one 
non-commissioned  officer  and  three  troopers  each.  The 
captain  of  each  company  will  serve  as  officer  of  the  guard 
for  his  company  on  picket  service,  and  a  field  officer,  or 


lio 


senior  captain,  will  be  officer  of  the  day  fov  the  whole  line 
of  the  regiment,  battalion,  or  squadron  on  outpost  duty. 

20.  The  company  commander  ^vill  be  habitually  with 
the  reserve,  established  at  a  central  point  in  rear  of  the 
picket  posts. 


GEiNERAL  INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  BATTLE. 


1.  Field  and  company  officers  arc  specially  enjoined  to 
instrnct  their  men,  under  all  circumstances,  to  fire  with 
deliberation  at  the  feet  of  the  enemy;  they  will  thus  avoid 
overshooting,  and,  besides,  wounded  men  give  more  trouble 
to  our  adversary  than  his  dead,  as  they  have  to  be  taken 
from  the  field. 

2.  Officers  in  command  must  be  cool  and  collected  in 
action,  hold  their  men  in  hand,  and  caution  them  against 
useless,  aimless  firing.  The  men  must  be  instructed  and 
required  each  one  to  single  out  his  mark.  It  was  the  delib- 
erate sharp-shooting  of  our  forefathers  in  the  Revolution 
of  1776,  and  at  I^ew  Orleans,  in  1815,  which  made  them 
so  formidable  against  the  odds  with  which  they  were 
engaged. 

3.  In  the  beginning  of  a  battle,  except  by  troops  de- 
ployed as  skirmishers,  the  fire  by  file  will  be  avoided;  it 
excites  the  men,  and  renders  their  subsequent  control  diffi- 
cult; fire  by  wing  or  company  should  be  resorted  to  instead. 
During  the  battle,  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers must  keep  the  men  in  ranks,  enforce  obedience,  and 
encourage  and  stimulate  them  if  necessary. 

4.  Soldiers  must  not  be  permitted  to  quit  the  ranks  to 
strip  or  rob  the  dead,  nor  even  to  assist  in  removing  our 
own  dead,  unless  by  special  permission,  which  shall  only 
be  given  when  the  action  has  been  decided.  The  surest 
way  to  protect  our  wounded  is  to  drive  the  enemy  from 
the  field ;  the  most  pressing,  highest  duty  is  to  win  the 
victory. 

5.  Before  the  battle,  the  quartermaster  of  the  division 
will  make  all  the  necessary  arrangements  for  the  imme- 


27 

diate  transportation  of  the  wounded  from  the  field.  After 
consulting  with  the  medical  otfieers,  he  will  establish  the 
ambulance  depot  in  the  rear,  and  give  his  assistants  the 
necessary  instructions  for  the  efficient  service  of  tlie  ambu- 
lance wagons  and  other  means  of  transportation. 

6.  The  anibulancc  depot,  to  wliich  the  wounded  are  to 
be  conveyed  or  directed  for  immediate  treatment,  should 
be  established  at  the  most  convenient  building  nearest  the 
field  of  battle.     A  red  flag  marks  the  place  and  way  to  it. 

7.  Before  aTid  immediately  atter  battle  the  roll  of  each 
company  will  be  called,  and  absentees  must  strictly  account 
for  their  absence  from  the  ranks.  To  quit  their  standard 
on  the  battle-lield,  under  fire,  under  the  pretence  of  remov- 
ing or  aiding  the  wounded,  will  not  be  permitted.  Any 
one  persisting  in  it  will  be  shot  on  the  spot;  and  whoever 
shall  be  found  to  have  quit  the  field,  or  his  regiment,  or 
company  without  authority  will  be  i-egarded  and  pro- 
claimed as  a  coward,  and  dealt  with  accordingly. 

8.  The  active  ambulances  will  follow  the  troops  to  succor 
the  wounded,  and  to  remove  them  to  the  depots.  Before ' 
the  engagement  Infirmary  detachments  will  also  be  de- 
tailed and  organized,  of  three  (the  least  efl:ective  under 
arms)  from  each  compan\',  whose  duties  will  be  hereinafter 
prescribed.  These  men  vui.st  not  loiter  about  the  depots^  but  icUl 
return  prompth/  to  the  field  as  800\i  as  j)f>ssible. 

9.  The  Infirmary  detachments  will  be  under  the  imme- 
diate orders  of  the  medical  officers  on  the  field.  This 
corps  is  to  go  upon  the  field  unarmed,  except  the  non-com- 
missioned officers,  who  are  to  protect  the  corps  against 
stragglers  and  marauders.  The  mend)ers  will  be  provided 
with  one  litter  to  every  two  men,  and  each  with  a  badge 
by  which  he  can  be  easily  distinguished  from  the  rest  of 
the  command;  also  with  leather  shoulder-straps,  a  canteen 
of  water,  a  tin  ciip,  a  haversack,  containing  an  eighth- 
pound  of  lint,  four  bandages,  two  long  and  two  short 
sphnts  of  wood,  sponges  and  tourniquets,  and  a  pint  bottle 
of  alcoholic  stimulants. 

10.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  this  corps,  under  the  imme- 


28 

diate'  direction  of  the  assistant  snrgeon  of  the  regiment, 
accompanied  hj'  the  ambulances  or  wagons,  to  follow  up 
promptly  the  action,  administering  .to  the  immediate  wants 
of  the  wounded,  by  giving  stimulus,  checking  hemorrhage, 
and  the  temporary  splinting  of  fractures. 

11.  Those  Avho  are  too  much  disabled  to  walk  will  be 
removed  to  some  ambulance  depot,  previously  agreed  upon, 
where  they  will  be  left  in  charge  of  the  surgeon  of  the 
regiment.  The  removal  of  the  wounded  from  the  field 
will  devolve  upon  the  Infirmary  corps,  and  till  men  strag- 
gling from  the  ranks  uilder  pretext  of  aiding  this  corps 
will  be  summarily  dealt  with,  to  which  end  the  medical 
ofiicers  in  charge  and  the  non-commissioned  officers  are 
specially  required  to  report  to  the  regimental  commanders 
of  the  stragglers  their  names,  and  the  companies  to  which' 
they  may  belong. 

12.  The  assistant  surgeon  in  charge  of  the  Infirmary 
corps  should  provide  himself  with  a  pocket-case,  ligatures, 
needles,  pins,  chloroform,  napkins,  brand}-  or  whiskey, 
tourniquets,  bandages,  lint,  and  spirits.  To  obviate  the 
shock  of  the  nervous  system,  to  suppress  hemorrhage,  to 
put  fractures  in  some  temporary  apparatus,  so  as  to  facili- 
tate the  removal  of  the  wounded,  should  be  his  first  care. 
This  last  is  best  accomplished  by  placing  under  the  frac- 
tured limb  a  piece  of  old  linen  or  cotton  of  the  form  of  a 
pocket-handkerchief;  on  the  opposite  and  outer  edges  of 
this  are  placed  the  splints,  which  are  rolled  up  in  it,  toward 
the  lint,  on  eadh  side,  until  the  fracture  is  snugly  sup- 
ported in  the  intervening  space;  the  whole  to  be  secured 
by  two  or  three  bands  of  tape  or  bandage. 

13.  The  regimental  surs^eon  should,  before  an  action, 
satisfy  himself  by  personal  inspection  that  all  the  means 
and  appliances  for  carr3'ing  the  wounded  are  at  hand;  give 
instructions  to  the  Infirmary  corps  as  to  Ihe  application  of  a 
tourniquet  to  restrain  dangerous  hemorrhage;  establish  de- 
pots for  the  wounded,  under  the  supervision  of  the  medical 
director;  and  render  to  the  men  of  his  regiment  all  neces- 
sary surgical  aid ;  performing  there  all  operations  that  are 


29 


required;  and  lie  will  be  held  responsible  that  he  has  at  his 
disposition  all  the  means,  supplies,  and  appliances  for  the 
proper  performance  of  the  service  enjoined,  or  has  taken 
all  propernieasnres  t()  secure  them.  He  will  instruct  all 
detailed  to  assist  him  not  to  allow  ambulances  to  be  mo- 
nopolized by  wounded  officers  to  the  exclusion  of  others, 
lie  will  forbid  any  of  the  Infirmary  corps  to  hold  officers' 
horses  on  the  field,  or  to  do  anything-  but  what  strictly  ap- 
portains  to^  their  duty.  The  surgeon  should  not  devote 
liimself  exclusively  to  a  wounded  officer,  nor  leave  his  post 
to  accompany  him  to  the  rear. 

14.  Wounds  will  be  dressed  and  operations  performed  as 
far  as  practicable  on  the  field,  and  patients  made  as  comfort- 
able as  circumstances  will  admit  for  transportation  to  hos- 
pitals in  the  interior. 

15.  Surgeons  will  supply  themselves  with  hospital  flags, 
and  will  have  them  attached  to  the  ambulances  and  placed 
conspicuously  over  the  field  infirmaries  and  hospitals. 

16.  As  soon  as  possible  after  an  action,  surgeons  will 
transmit  to  the  medical  director  a  return  of  casualties  ac- 
cordinir  to  the  foUowiuir  form: 


Heiurn  of  Killed  and  Wounded  in  the 
Action  of 


liegimenf  in  the 


Wounded. 

> 
C 

Si 
c 

b' 

C 

a 

2 
o 
s 
— 

< 
i 

: 

2 

11km  ARKS. 

Officers 

N.  C.  Officers. . 
Privates 

Names  of  Officers   killed   and 
wounded  to  be  inserted  here. 

17.  The  material  for  the  badges  and  for  the  ambulance 
fla,gs  prescribed  in  paragraph  Yl  will  be  provided  by  the 
quartermaster's  department. 


REVIEWS. 


1.  The  reviewing  officer,  upon  his  arrival  on  the  ground, 
will  receive  an  artillery  salute  when  entitled  to  it,  unless 
otherwise  specially  ordered.  ISTine  guns  will  be  fired  for  a 
General  of  the  Confederate  army,  eight  for  a  Lieuteuant- 
General,  seven  for  a  ]\Iajor-General,  and  six  for  a  Brigadier- 
General. 

2.  The  reviewing  officer  having  taken  his  position  near 
the  camp  color,  placed  beforehand  at  a  suitable  distance  in 
front  of  the  line,  the  district  or  other  commander  of  the 
forces,  part  of  which  are  about  to  be  reviewed,  Avill,  if  pres- 
ent, and  of  an  inferior  rank  to  the  reviewing  officer,  take 
place  one  step  to  the  left,  the  head  of  his  horse  on  a  line 
with  the  haunches  of  the  reviewing  officer's  horse. 

An}'  invited  guest  will  take  his  position  on  the  left  of  the 
district  or  other  commander  of  the  forces. 

3.  The  chief  of  staff,  when  on  the  ground,  w^ill  be  three 
steps  to  the  rear  and  one  to  the  left  of  the  general.  The 
other  members  of  the  staff  of  the  reviewing  officer  will 
form  in  one  rank  if  their  number  does  not  exceed  eight, 
and  in  two  ranks  if  more  than  eight,  at  a  distance  of  at 
least  eight  paces  to  the  rear  and  left,  the  officers  of  the 
personal  staff  on  the  right  of  the  line,  according  to  rank, 
and  the  right  of  the  line  directly  behind  the  reviewing 
officer. 

4.  The  staff  of  the  district  or  other  commander  of  the 
forces  to  be  reviewed,  or  of  any  general  officer  takiifg 
position  near  the  reviewing  officer,  will  form  in  rear  of 
staff  of  latter,  in  accordance  with  the  third  clause  of  these 
orders. 


31 

5.  When  the  reviewing  officer  advances  to  review  the 
line,  the  district  or  other  commander  of  the  forces,  any 
invited  guest,  and  the  cliief  of  staff  present  will  move 
with  him,  and  the  otlicj*  members  of  the  staff  (breaking  by 
fours  right  in  front)  will  follow  at  the  respective  distances 
mentioned  above,  the  left  of  each  rank  of  fours  being 
directly  behind  the  reviewing  officer. 

6.  After  reviewing  the  front  and  rear  of  the  line  the 
reviewing  officer  will  resume  his  position  in  front  of  it, 
and  the  staff  is  again  formed  as  before  indicated. 

7.  "When  general  officers  dismount  in  front  of  their 
commands,  before  being  passed  in  review  by  their  supe- 
riors in  rank,  their  staff  officers  must  occupy  the  position 
required  by  paragraph  354,  Arm}'  Regnhitions,  to  wit: 

"AVhen  two  or  more  battalions  arc  to  be  reviewed,  they 
will  be  formed  in  parade  order  with  the  proper  intervals, 
and  will  also  perform  the  same  movements  that  are  laid 
down  for  a  single  battalion,  observing  the  additional  direc- 
tions that  are  given  for  such  movements  when  applied  to 
the  line.  The  brigadier-general  and  his  staff,  on  foot,  will 
place  themselves  opposite  the  centre  of  the  brigade;  the 
l)rigadier-general  two  paces  in  front  of  the  rank  of  colonels, 
his  aid  two  paces  on  his  right,  and  one  retired;  and  the 
other  brigade  staff  officers,  those  having  the  rank  of  iield 
officers  in  the  rank  of  lieutenants-colonel  and  majors,  and 
those  below  that  rank  in  the  line  of  company  officers." 

8.  In  all  reviews,  the  commander  only  of  the  division, 
brigade,  or  regiment,  as  the  case  may  be,  having  put  the 
column  in  motion,  and  arriving  at  the  proper  distance 
(after  saluting  the  reviewing  officer)  will  take  his  position 
one  pace  on  the  right,  the  head  of  liis  horse  on  a  line  with 
the  haunches  of  the  latter's  horse.  lie  will  remain  near 
the  reviewing  officer  during  the  defile,  after  which  he  will 
rejoin  liis  command.  ' 

9.  The  following  paragraphs  of  Army  Regulations  will, 
in  all  cases   required,  be  strictl}'  observed,  to  wit:  para- 
graphs 336,  337,  340,  342,  343,  344,  347,  348,  354,  355,  358,. 
360. 


32 

10.  Staff  officers  will  not  draw  their  swords  unless  placed 
ill  actual  command  of  troops. 

11.  Staff  officers  are  expected  to  familiarize  themselves 
with  the  general  principles  of  cavalry  tactics,  and  to  adhere 
strictly  to  the  rules  prescribed  for  the  dressings,  the  break- 
ings by  fours,  the  formations  into  line,  etc.,  etc. 

12.  Officers  on  duty  at  reviews  or  elsewhere,  when  walk- 
ing or  riding  together,  will  occupy  positions  according  to 
rank :  the  senior  on  the  right. 

13.  All  staff  officers  will  wear  the  badges  prescribed  in 
General  Orders,  'No.  76,  series  1862,  from  these  head- 
quarters, when  on  duty  with  their  side  arms. 


